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Abstract—In this paper, we elaborate a methodology to study 
a particular case of collaborative network: city logistics. We 
identify that many solutions for urban logistics are, most of time, 
badly evaluated. Indeed, the theory often predicts a positive 
effect but the reality is most of time counterbalanced. We tried to 
fill this gap by making use of innovative methods. To do so, we 
mobilize several domains of knowledge: operational research, 
game theory and transportation studies on real cases. We suggest 
a solution to anticipate the level of activity of an Urban Consoli-
dation Center and determine the condition under which it gene-
rates benefit for a carrier using or not, the collaborative network. 
We present the result obtained by application of our method on 
the real case of the city of Saint-Etienne. 
Keywords—Sustainable collaborative network; Urban 
consolidation center; Games theory; City logistics 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
City logistics are the last link of complex supply chains and 
involve numerous stakeholders: carriers, shopkeepers, e-
customers, inhabitants, public administration, etc. It is a small 
part of the total traveled distance, nevertheless it can represent 
until 28% of the total transport cost [1]. Moreover, air pollution 
emissions related to urban freight transport is estimated be-
tween 16% and 50% of the global pollution made by transport 
activities in a city [2]. So, it is necessary to think about solu-
tions to relieve the traffic congestion on the city center and 
reduce the environmental impact of urban freight transport. 
Regarding the complexity of the urban logistic system and 
associated collaborations, we have to identify innovative and 
“smartly” ways to support economic activities of city centers. 
Lots of solutions are available in the literature. Most of 
them are the results of experiments which make difficult de-
termining characteristics to provide sustainable models to pub-
lic Decision Makers (DMs) who aim at implementing innova-
tive collaborative ecosystems in terms of urban freight trans-
portation. Indeed, there is a need to establish models which 
allow ex ante assessment. Russo and Comi [3] have identified 
the necessity of an ex ante approach and they proposed a classi-
fication of city logistics solutions in four classes: measures 
related to material infrastructure, measures related to equip-
ment, measures related to Intelligent Transportation Systems 
and measures related to governance. 
We choose studying a measure related to material infra-
structure which represents a particular node of the urban logis-
tic system: an Urban Consolidation Center (UCC). This type of 
measure is the solution the most considered in European cities 
and several questions appear with such projects.  
Actually, theoretically speaking, UCCs are very efficient 
but most of time the practice produces the opposite of expected 
results [4]. Probably this gap can be filled with an in-depth and 
sustainable ex ante evaluation of the impacts of a UCC. Our 
challenge is to answer the following questions: How is it possi-
ble to anticipate the activity level of a UCC? Which level of 
sustainability can be reached? Our approach is to determine the 
flows that the UCC will be able to capture. In other terms, we 
seek at characterizing the different situations inciting local 
carriers to change their behavior and so to subcontract their 
freight delivery by collaborating or not with UCC. Finally, we 
aim to purchase a help to answer the question of Make or Buy: 
under which conditions have I an interest to do by myself or to 
pay somebody? 
To this goal, we propose to study particular games defined 
by this situation where economic players (local carriers) have 
to choose between two decisions: whether to use or not the 
collaborative logistic network proposed in order to deliver the 
city center. At this step, the target is not to perfectly optimize 
particular delivery routes in a city center. We are faced with 
decision consisting on evaluating the potential attraction of a 
collaborative network according to the local stakeholders’ 
(mainly carriers) interests. Consequently, we suggest using 
simulation (coupling with operational research in order to 
represent rational behavior of carriers) so as to explore differ-
ent demand scenarios (rather than a unique route). The demand 
is modeled as the number of delivery points that have to be 
visited by carriers. It describes solicitation scenarios of the 
logistic network. 
We first present the background about UCC, vehicle 
routing and game theory. We then describe the proposed ap-
proach. Finally, an example is developed just before giving 
some conclusions and perspectives. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Urban Consolidation Center (UCC) 
The different experiments in the literature show that al-
though the potential of UCCs seems to be significant, it is not 
always true in real life. Actually, it is very often the opposite: 
most of UCC failed. This is probably due to the fact that cases 
are not based on realistic estimates [5]. 
We intend to elaborate a model to determine the quantity of 
flow that a UCC is able to capture. We consider the UCC as a 
part of an urban system which is composed by carriers and 
delivery points. It has been showed that the chosen strategy in 
an UCC scheme is extremely important to guarantee the carri-
ers ‘adoption to the project [6]. That is why it is primordial to 
define correctly the relative position of an UCC in the whole 
system. In the literature (eg [7], [8]), we distinguish several 
attributes which describe UCC. We classify these attributes in 
two categories: those in relation with the location of the UCC 
and those in relation with the area serviced. In the former, we 
classify the distance between UCC and the city center, the 
distance between the UCC and other carriers. In the latter, we 
find the spatial coverage (the area serviced), the number of 
kilometers per vehicle, the number of vehicle routes, travel 
time, number of delivery points, number of parcels per day and 
operating cost. This allows describing the behavior and interac-
tions of such urban logistic base. 
In this paper, we choose studying a reduced system includ-
ing an UCC in order to qualify, step by step, its effect on city 
flows. For this first study, we will include two attributes de-
scribing the location of the UCC: the distance between UCC 
and the city center and the distance between UCC and other 
carriers; as well as attributes describing the area serviced: the 
number of vehicle kilometers, the number of vehicle routes, the 
number of delivery points and the spatial coverage. 
B. Vehicle routing 
An important step in the decision making process is to de-
fine the routes for product delivery. This problem is usually 
solved as a vehicle routing problem (VRP). The VRP is a com-
plex optimization problem known to be NP-hard. Most of solu-
tion approaches are based on approximate algorithms providing 
a good feasible solution. In the literature, a lot of works have 
been proposed to solve the VRP and some of its variants. State 
of the art surveys can be found (see for example [9], [10], 
[11]). Regarding the applications in urban logistics, less num-
ber of papers have been published (see for example [12], [13], 
[14], [15]). Hence, an important contribution to research in this 
area concerns the definition of routing strategies for such com-
plex freight delivery within urban areas. Indeed, as vehicle 
routing is a complex problem, particular constraints of routing 
in urban areas (in comparison with interurban freight transport) 
have to be taken into account when solving goods distribution 
problems in city centers. This paper shows how a well-known 
heuristic named GRASP can be used in this context. 
C. Games theory 
Many real-life situations, such as those encountered in 
Supply Chain Management (SCM), present multi-actor con-
frontations and collaboration levels. In this context, the conse-
quence of a decision for a given DM is a function of: (i) its 
own future decisions; (ii) the future (and uncertain) events that 
will occur; (iii) decisions of other DMs that may have indirect 
consequences for him [16]. Consequently, the optimal choice 
for a DM depends on those of the other DMs. The DMs are 
described as being in strategic interaction. This clearly defines 
a game theory context where each DM may be seen as a player 
seeking to maximize his own profit. Potential consequences for 
each player are called payoffs. 
A game can be cooperative or non-cooperative [17]. In the 
former, all players are linked with restrictive agreement(s). 
They define a coalition (such as the Selves in the Veto-Process 
method above). In the latter, no coalition can be organized. 
Non-cooperative games can be described in two different ways: 
• Strategic form game: a collection of strategies defining
all possible actions of each player in all possible situa-
tions with associated profits (payoffs). 
Payoffs: (Player 1, Player 2) 
Player 2 
Decision 1 Decision 2
Player 1 
Decision a ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶሻ ሺܾଵǡ ܾଶሻ
Decision b ሺܿଵǡ ܿଶሻ ሺ݀ଵǡ ݀ଶሻ
Table 1: Strategic form game 
• Extensive form game: a tree describing how the game is
played. It is a dynamic description of the game because 
it specifies the sequence of decisions made by players. 
Each decision node represents a player who has to make 
a decision, using the information available at this time. 
Payoffs associated with each scenario (a particular se-
quence of decisions and events) are represented by 
leaves. 
In this paper, the problem under study is close to a non-zero 
sum (the interest to one of the carrier to participate to the colla-
borative network should not be exactly opposite to the interest 
to the other carrier) non-cooperative (carriers have to be willing 
to take the risk to participate without knowing if the other will 
either) game with information that is perfect (no simultaneous 
decision), symmetrical (same knowledge for all players) and 
complete (each player knows all strategies and associated 
payoffs). Furthermore, this game is not repeated. 
III. SOLUTION APPROACH 
A. Global approach 
As illustrated in the Figure 1, our approach is composed by 
five main steps: 
(1)The city center is represented as graph ܩ ൌ ሺܰǡ ܣሻ defined 
by a set of nodes ܰ and a set of arcs ܣ. It represents the 
road network and the potential delivery points; 
(2)Demand scenarios (subset of the set of potential delivery 
points) are randomly generated (could be based on particu-
lar attribute of each point, such as the frequency of delive-
ries); 
Figure 1: Global approach 
(3)For each demand scenario, several logistical configurations 
are simulated where routes in the network are generated, 
going from the classical configuration where each carrier 
has its own route (they do not use the UCC), to the com-
plete collaborative logistics network use where carriers de-
liver through the UCC, as well as partial utilizations of the 
collaborative network where some carriers do use the UCC; 
(4) Each logistic configurations of each scenario is evaluated 
(in terms of total km); and 
(5)Results from demand scenario are aggregated (equal proba-
bilities for each scenario) and the game is analyzed in order 
to anticipate the DMs’ interest to join the collaborative 
network. The aim is to identify classes of game situations. 
B. Model of the urban logistic system and notations 
The object under study is a city center. Figure 2 represents 
one configuration of the city center as it can be used in the 
study. The model is however general and this is a schematic 
representation that has been simplified for a better comprehen-
sion of the system and its different parameters. 
Figure 2: Model of the urban logistic system 
As show in Figure 2, two kinds of zones are defined in our 
approach: 
(i) An external zone (from the city center point of view) where 
local carriers (we note H the set of carriers) and UCC are si-
tuated (H1 and H2 in the Figure 2). We make the hypothesis 
that each carrier and the UCC have a single entry/exit point 
into the city center area. Each carrier/UCC position is cha-
racterized by its distance from its entry/exit point (k1, k2, δ). 
Carriers (noted i) are also defined by the distance from the 
UCC (li). Each carrier (i) has two possible choices in terms 
of UCC service utilization: it decides to perform all its 
routes to the UCC (ܷܥܥ௜) or not (ܷܥܥ௜). A partial affecta-
tion of the carrier flow to the UCC is not considered in this 
study. When ܷܥܥ௜ is chosen, the carrier has the possibility
to mutualize the delivery to the UCC (for example, a big 
truck can be used to deliver the items instead of having two 
littler trucks). We note as ܾܰ௠௨௧௜՜௨௖௖ the number of trucks
needed to deliver the UCC from the carrier i. 
(ii)The city center where roads network and potential delivery 
points are modeled with precision through a graph ܩ ൌሺܰǡ ܣሻ defined by a set of nodes ܰ (including roads inter-
sections and delivery points) and a set of arcs ܣ (roads cha-
racterized by distance). 
A given number of delivery points ൫ܾܰ௉௧௜ ൯ in the city center
area is randomly selected with replacement and affected to 
each carrier. All rounds of each carrier (noted ݎଵǡଶǥ௜ ) or
UCC (noted ݎଵǡଶǥ௨௖௖ ) go through the associated entry/exit
point and is characterized by a maximum number of deli-
very points (noted ܯܽݔ௥భǡమǥ೔  and ܯܽݔ௥భǡమǥೠ೎೎ ) and a total dis-
tance ܭ݉௥భǡమǥ೔  and ܭ݉௥భǡమǥೠ೎೎ ). We note ܴ௜(resp. ܴ௨௖௖) the set
of rounds associated to the carrier i (resp. to the UCC) and ܾܰ௥௜  the number of rounds associated to the carrier
C. Model of the carrier behavior (vehicle routing) 
Based on the graph representation of the city, it is then 
possible to implement a strategy for product delivery in the city 
center that is to solve the vehicle routing problem. The solution 
procedure for each instance was defined as follow: 
Step 1: Initialize number and location of depots, vehicles as-
signed to each depot and nodes to be visited by each depot. 
Step 2: Assign nodes to each vehicle in each depot. This as-
signment tries to minimize the average distance between 
the starting point for each vehicle (depot location) and all 
nodes assigned, ensuring that the vehicles will stay near the 
depot and will travel similar distances. 
Step 3: For each vehicle in each depot, determine the order in 
which the assigned nodes should be visited. This is done by 
solving a TSP (Travelling Salesman Problem) using 
GRASP (Greedy Randomized Adaptive Search Procedure), 
for each vehicle. 
A GRASP algorithm was employed to define the routes for 
product delivery [18]. GRASP is a multi-start meta-heuristic 
algorithm consisting of two phases (construction and local 
search) for each iteration. The construction phase builds a feas-
ible solution, whose neighborhood is investigated until a local 
minimum is found during the local search phase. The best 
overall solution is kept as the result [19]. 
To carry out the Constructive Phase, the definition of a util-
ity or cost function is necessary. This evaluates all possible 
elements that could be part of the solution. When all elements 
are evaluated, a Restricted Candidate List (RCL) is populated 
with those elements that exhibit the best values of the utility 
function. After the RCL is full, an element is selected at ran-
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dom to be added into the problem solution. This procedure is 
repeated until an initial solution is created. For this particular 
problem, the utility function was defined as [18]: ݃ሺݔሻ ൌ σ ݀ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ௘אா̳ሼ௫ሽȁܧȁ (1) 
Where ݔ is a node to include in the vehicle route; ݀ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ 
is the distance between nodes ݔ and ݁and ܧ is the set of nodes 
not yet visited. At the initial stage none of nodes has been 
added to the initial solution. After the Constructive Phase the 
solution neighborhood is investigated during the Local Search 
phase in order to improve the solution, while maintaining it 
into a feasible domain. This is done by reorganizing and 
swapping the order in which a vehicle visits the nodes as-
signed using 2-Optimal moves [20]. 
D. Evaluation of the catching 
To estimate the flow catch by the UCC we study the game 
where the set of players are the set of carriersܪ, the set of 
decision of each players is ௜ܺ א ൛ܷܥܥ௜ ǡ ܷܥܥ௜ൟ׊݅ א ܪ. Players
want to minimize the cost function (݂ǣ ܺǡ ܵ ฽ Թ with ܺ the set 
of strategy and ܵ the set of scenarios of delivery points). The 
cost function evaluates the truck travelled distance per total 
number of deliver points. Indeed, based on carriers’ interviews, 
even if the price range is given by delivery point, it is generally 
calculated by estimating travelled kilometers for one position. 
That is why we determine the cost function as follow: when the 
carrier does not use the UCC, the cost function is defined by 
the sum between two times the product of the distance between 
his platform and the city center and the number of rounds, and 
the sum of travelled distance to do rounds, divided by the num-
ber of delivery points (see (2)). We consider that the carrier go 
back to his platform after delivering the city center which is 
translated by the coefficient “2” in the first member of (2).  
In the case where carrier gives all his rounds to the UCC, 
the cost function (3) is similar as (2) except the introduction of 
a distance from the carrier’s platform to the UCC and between 
the UCC and the city center. Moreover, as explain in section 
III.B., we consider that carrier can mutualize his rounds to
transport the freight to the UCC. For the decision ܷܥܥ௜ the
function (2) depends only on itself. Otherwise the cost function 
(3) depends on itself and the delivery points carrying by the 
UCC. 
௜݂௎஼஼തതതതതത ൌ ʹܾܰ௥௜ܾܰ௉௧௜ ݇௜ ൅σ ܭ݉௥೘೔௠ୀ௖௔௥ௗሺோ೔ሻ௠ୀଵ ܾܰ௉௧௜ ൌ ߙ௜݇௜ ൅ ߚ௜ (2) 
௜݂௎஼஼ ൌ ʹܾܰ௠௨௧௜՜௨௖௖ܾܰ௉௧௜ ݈௜ ൅ ʹܾܰ௥௨௖௖ܾܰ௉௧௨௖௖ ߜ ൅ σ ܭ݉௥೘ೠ೎೎௠ୀ௖௔௥ௗሺோೠ೎೎ሻ௠ୀଵ ܾܰ௉௧௨௖௖ൌ ߛ௜݈௜ ൅ ߤ௨௖௖ߜ ൅ ߪ௨௖௖ (3) 
To evaluate the cost function over all scenarios we assume 
• The equal probability over scenarios
• The DM minimize him expected cost (see (4) and (5))ൣ ௜݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧ ൌ ߙ௜݇௜ ൅ σ ߚ௜ǡ௦ୱאୗȁȁ (4) 
ൣ ௜݂ǡ௦௎஼஼൧ ൌ ߛ݈݅௜ ൅ ߤ௨௖௖ߜ ൅ σ ߪݑܿܿǡݏୱאୗȁȁ (5) 
So from the simulation we compute for each scenario the 
cost and then we compute the expected cost of each player for 
each strategy. We are therefore in a particular form where (with 
the notation of the Table 1) c1 = d1 and b2 = d2. The evaluation 
of each strategy is the expected cost function. With the notation 
introduced above, the strategic form of the game is: 
i=2 ܷܥܥଶ ܷܥܥଶതതതതതതത
i=1 
ܷܥܥଵ ൣ ଵ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼൧; ൣ ଶ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼൧  ቂ ଵ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼భ ௎஼஼మതതതതതതതതΤ ቃ Ǣ ൣ ଶ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧ܷܥܥଵതതതതതതത ൣ ଵ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧Ǣ  ቂ ଶ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼భതതതതതതതത ௎஼஼మΤ ቃ ൣ ଵ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧Ǣ ൣ ଶ݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧
Table 2: strategic of the UCC game 
As in real life, the initial state is ܷܥܥଵതതതതതതതȀܷܥܥଶതതതതതതത. We are seeking 
equilibrium for carriers’ strategy. The target is to identify situa-
tions when the initial state is no more an equilibrium. There are 
two cases. The first one is to look for situations in which all 
carriers have an interest joining the UCC (corresponds to (6)); 
the second one is to identify situations in which one carrier can 
have an interest collaborating with the UCC (representing by 
(7)). These cases are translated by knowing when: ׊݅ א ܪǡ ൣ ௜݂ǡ௦௎஼஼൧ ൏ ൣ ௜݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧׊ ௝ܺ א ൛ܷܥܥ௝ ǡ ܷܥܥ௝ൟ׊݆א ܪǡ ݆ ് ݅ (6) ׌݅ א ܪǡ  ቂ ௜݂ǡ௦௎஼஼೔ ௎஼஼ണതതതതതതതΤ ቃ ൏ ൣ ௜݂ǡ௦௎஼஼തതതതതത൧׊ ௝ܺא ൛ܷܥܥ௝ ǡ ܷܥܥ௝ൟ׊݆ א ܪǡ ݆ ് ݅ (7) 
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Presentation 
In order to illustrate the implementation of the proposed 
approach, experiments were carried out using real data from 
the city of Saint-Étienne, France, which is a city in eastern 
central France. It is located in the Massif Central, 60 km 
southwest of Lyon in the Rhône-Alpes region. Saint-Étienne is 
the capital of the Loire Department and has a population of 
approximately 175000 inhabitants in the city itself, expanding 
to over 400000 inhabitants in the metropolitan area (2010). 
B. Characterization of the case 
The study takes into account a system composed by two lo-
cal carriers: H1 and H2. Consequently we evaluated 4 
(2card(H)=22=4) different logistic configurations from a graph 
defined by 200 nodes, which correspond to the potential de-
mand points, and 40000 (200×200) arcs. 
We consider that each carrier organizes two routes 
(׊݅ǡ ܾܰ௥௜ ൌ ʹ), each with 40 delivery points (׊݅ǡ ܾܰ௉௧௜ ൌ ͺͲ).
However, if two trucks are necessary to deliver the 80 points, 
we assume that one truck is able to deliver the whole freight 
from the carrier to the UCC, so that means ሺܾܰ௠௨௧௜՜௎஼஼ ൌ ͳሻ for
each carrier Hi. Indeed, often city centers’ roads are really 
small and make carriers do use small trucks to access delivery 
points. When carrier chooses collaborating with the UCC, he 
can be able to use bigger truck to transport the same freight. 
We also assume that when a carrier decides to give some 
freight to the UCC, it performs all its routing, i.e. 80 delivery 
points. This hypothesis is justified by the fact that even if the 
activity of carrier is not just the city center but also the suburb 
and other city, in this paper we are just interested by rounds for 
which he wonders: Can I do by myself or pay somebody to do 
for me (make or buy)? That is why the hypothesis that he gives 
all his freight is suitable. So when one carrier entrusts its rout-
ing to the UCC’s service, then ܾܰ௉௧௎஼஼ ൌ ͺͲ; when both carriers
subcontract their routing to the UCC then ܾܰ௉௧௎஼஼ ൌ ͳ͸Ͳ, even
if a single delivery position is visited by both carriers. Thus 
UCC can benefit from concentration of delivery point to pro-
pose services with attractive prices. 
To obtain data as close as possible from reality, we simu-
lated ten different replicates of customer location. For each 
replicate, delivery points were randomly selected for each 
carrier within a list of 200 possible location points on the net-
work. This allows us to obtain averaged parameters more rep-
resentative of reality than just a single random distribution. 
Moreover it characterizes correctly the fact that carriers do not 
always use the same routes in the city center. In our decision 
level, we are not able to say the exact location of delivery 
points. However we can try to obtain a model of a possible 
general activity. 
i=2 ܷܥܥଶ ܷܥܥଶതതതതതതത 
i=1 
ܷܥܥଵ (0.025*l1 +0.05*į+0.92) ; (0.025*l2+0.05*į+0.92) (0.025*l1 +0.05*į+1.21) ; (0.05*k2+1.12)  ܷܥܥଵതതതതതതത (0.05*k1+1.19) ; (0.025*l2+0.05*į+1.16) (0.05*k1+1.19) ; (0.05*k2+1.12) 
Table 3: Resulting cost functions 
The result of simulation is represented by the below table of 
game (Table 3). These first results give some interesting infor-
mation. Indeed, it shows that if one carrier collaborates with 
the UCC then he has no interest to go back alone if the other 
comes also. It can be see with results for carrier 2 (resp. 1) 
where (ߪ௨௖௖௔ ሺܷܥܥͳǡ ܷܥܥʹሻ ൌ Ͳǡͻʹ ൏ ߪ௨௖௖௔ ሺܷܥܥͳǡ ܷܥܥʹതതതതതതሻ ൌ ͳǡʹͳ)
and (ߪ௨௖௖௕ ሺܷܥܥͳǡ ܷܥܥʹሻ ൌ Ͳǡͻʹ ൏ ߪ௨௖௖௕ ሺܷܥܥͳതതതതതതǡ ܷܥܥʹሻ ൌ ͳǡͳ͸).
Finally, we are able to conclude yet that our situation corre-
sponds to equilibrium in pure strategy. 
The next step is to find the different values of ki, li and ߜ 
which resolve (6) and (7). 
C. Results / Discussion 
The solution space for each equation ((6) and (7)) can be 
represented by a tetrahedron possibly truncated (see Figure 3 
and Figure 4). The grey shaded face corresponds to the case 
where we have equality (i.e. same price for ܷܥܥ and ܷܥܥ). 
Below this surface, carrier has an interest to subcontract his 
freight to the UCC. The tetrahedron is completed by additional 
implicit constraints that prevent distance from being negative 
(ki>0, li>0 and ߜ>0). The graphic represents the general case 
from our simulations. 
It is possible to obtain a better view of the solution space by 
fixing ki, and representing it on a 2D graph. That gives an ap-
propriate means to visualize the admissible domains for a par-
ticular carrier. This admissible domain has a triangular shape. 
For each carrier it is possible to superimpose the result of (6) 
and (7) (see Figure 5). Two triangles appear. The small one 
corresponds to the case where carrier 1 uses alone UCC’s ser-
vice, the big one is the case where both carriers entrust their 
freight to the UCC. 
Figure 3: One carrier uses UCC Figure 4: Both carriers use UCC 
Figure 5: Surface area which describes the profit's zone for one carrier 
The straight line corresponds to positions where the cost 
function is equal, i.e. no profit is made by the carrier when 
going by UCC but no money is lost either. Points under this 
straight line depict UCC’s possible locations where the carrier 
would benefit from joining the UCC. Outside this joining UCC 
would result in extra cost and the carrier will rather not join it. 
In the present case, the surface area corresponding to the sce-
nario when the carrier comes alone is actually very difficult to 
satisfy. Indeed, for any possible set of value for li and ߜ lying in 
the favorable domain, UCC location is constrained to a narrow 
region close to the carrier itself and UCC entrance point for 
touring. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the size 
of this domain is considerably larger when both carriers use 
UCC’s service. Note also that ݈௜and ߜ axes do not have the
same scale or the same impact in term of cost. Concretely, it is 
more beneficial to enlarge ݈௜ and keep ߜ as low as possible.
This can be explained by the fact that the distance ݈௜ is realized
with a single big truck whereas ߜ is made once per routing. 
The situation may correspond to a classic problem of Stag 
Hunt Game. Indeed, each player (carriers) may have no interest 
to play alone because this situation would result in an increase 
of his own costs. But if both carriers decide to join the colla-
borative network, then their respective gains will increase in 
comparison with the initial situation. This type of game is non-
cooperative which means that carriers have to be willing to 
take the risk to participate without knowing if the other will 
either. 
To give a better understanding of this result, it is possible to 
represent on a map the set of points for each carrier (resp. 
UCC) not located further than a given distance ݈௜ (resp. ߜ) on
the network. This results in pseudo-circles are delimited by iso-
distance contours. Points located in the intersection of the three 
circles (݈ଵǡ ݈ଶand ߜ constant) are the set of favorable location
for UCC for each carrier. We present in the map below (Figure 
6) the case of two existing local carriers (݇ଵ ൌ ͳǡͶͺͷ݇݉ and݇ଶ ൌ ͹ǡͶʹ݇݉). We considered that carrier 1 enters from a
west point in city center and carrier 2 from an east point. In this 
case ݈ଵǡ ݈ଶand ߜ were chosen such as the involvement into
UCC is the favorable domain (inside the triangle) for both 
carrier. One of them is represented in white and the other in 
black. The grey color corresponds to the area where it is neces-
sary to install the UCC if we want that carriers are interesting 
by using it. The white area with small black points is the city 
center.  
Figure 6: Illustration of profit's area on the road map 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
In this study, we elaborate a methodology to characterize 
situations inciting carriers to collaborate with an UCC and 
change our conception of urban logistics in term of service. We 
showed that an efficient collaborative logistic network is possi-
ble. We enlighten the existence of areas where UCC can be 
implemented in a sustainable way according to a given cost 
function. Our method is really positioned as an ex ante decision 
making tool. It can be used to help the stakeholder in a before-
hand phase to identify a costly efficient UCC’s locations. We 
end up to a graphic representation of this admissible set of 
location using Geographical Information System. That gives an 
important and pragmatic help to DMs who do not necessarily 
have the in depth experience of city logistics projects. 
The defined function allows anticipating the behavior of 
carriers. Nevertheless, it can be improved. It would be neces-
sary to take into account the time dimension. Indeed, if the 
kilometer per parcel is a good indicator, the notion of time is 
not described in our model. It could results in a more precise 
anticipation of carriers’ behavior. Transport companies look for 
the best way in term of kilometers and time. Thus, a choice is 
made by the carrier to find the best compromise. Another field 
of investigation may concern the evaluation of pollution emis-
sions in the model. Full sustainability can only be achieved 
through an evaluation of environmental impact of city logistics 
measures and generated traffic flows. Including this dimension 
in our analysis could help DM to make environmental friendly 
decision. 
It could also be relevant to investigate scenarios with more 
actors and to refine our evaluation of each carrier needs. In-
volvement of a whole set of carrier could lead to complex sit-
uations in which various strategies for carriers may occur. 
Another perspective is to study the effect of public subvention. 
This could be a way to go to a stable configuration in which 
every carrier collaborates with little risk. 
Our work tries to give a new way to anticipate the construc-
tion of city logistics measures such as UCC by adopting a lo-
gistics’ point of view. We elaborate a global approach and 
investigate the question of UCC sustainability. We show that 
possible way to achieve this goal can be obtained by a combi-
nation of operational research, games theory, GIS and transpor-
tation studies on real cases experience. 
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